Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal Under the FMLA? The Potential of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family Conflicts by Silbaugh, Katharine B.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 15 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Ten Years of Experience 
2004 
Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal Under the 
FMLA? The Potential of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family 
Conflicts 
Katharine B. Silbaugh 
Boston University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katharine B. Silbaugh, Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal Under the FMLA? The Potential 
of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family Conflicts, 15 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 193 (2004), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/9 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
193 
 
Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal 
Under the FMLA? The Potential of the FMLA to 
Cover Ordinary Work-Family Conflicts 
Katharine B. Silbaugh∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides relief to 
workers, helping them in their struggle to meet the sometimes 
competing demands of work and family. There have been numerous 
attempts to expand legislation to cover more occasions where work 
and family obligations are in tension. This Article will address one 
way that the courts may be expanding the Act’s application. It will 
investigate whether this modest interpretive expansion can be 
explained partially by society’s deeper understanding of the 
challenges of work-family balance over the ten years since the 
FMLA’s passage. Have we changed our general understanding of 
conflicts between employment and family work from occasional and 
extraordinary events to frequent and ordinary ones? Consequently, is 
the paradigmatic work-family conflict pathological or normal under 
the FMLA? 
There are many critics of the FMLA. The business community 
complains that the FMLA affords too much coverage—arguing that 
the notice requirements placed on employees are insufficient, that the 
FMLA’s interaction with company sick-leave policies is 
unsatisfactory, that leave is taken in too small of increments, and that 
courts are too permissive in deciding what illnesses qualify under the 
Act. Advocates of employees complain that the FMLA’s scope and 
coverage are too limited. They argue that the Act applies to too few 
employees because of both the one year employment requirement and 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I wish to thank Michael Selmi 
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the exemption for employers with fewer than fifty workers.1 Some 
say the leave provided is not long enough in the case of birth or 
adoption, comparing the FMLA’s twelve week provision with the full 
year (or more) of parental leave provided in many developed 
countries. Others complain that, in practice, men do not take the 
provided leave to care for newborn children; still others say the 
definition of “family” is unfairly narrow in excluding many close-
knit relationships, such as those between same-sex partners. The most 
prominent complaint, however, is that there is no wage replacement 
in the law. Employee advocates have worked since the passage of the 
FMLA to establish paid leave, with increasing success towards the 
end of the Clinton administration.2 
This Article addresses a different criticism of the FMLA’s utility 
to parents, who originally were conceived as its prime beneficiaries.3 
Raising children is an enterprise that extends beyond the first twelve 
weeks of life, and a worker’s identity as a parent continues long after 
the twelve weeks expire and the parent returns to his or her job. The 
eighteen year dependency of a child has employment implications for 
parents. As a statute dealing with the short-term medical implications 
of family illnesses or childbirth, the FMLA has some value.4 
However, as a work-family policy statute—one premised on the 
 1. Senator Dodd (D-CT) has several times introduced legislation to extend the number of 
people covered by the Act. E.g., Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act, S. 304, 108th 
Cong. (2003); Family and Medical Leave Fairness Act of 1999, S. 201, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 2. The use of unemployment insurance trust funds made possible by an executive order 
under President Clinton has caused both great praise and great criticism, and has remained the 
focal point of much of the discussion of the FMLA for the past several years, ending with the 
George W. Bush administration rescinding the executive order. Regulations for Birth and 
Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 20 C.F.R. § 604 (2002) (rescinded Oct. 9, 2003). See 
also Letter from Jeffrey C. McGuiness, President, Labor Policy Ass’n, to President William J. 
Clinton, at http://www.hrpolicy.org/memoranda/1999/99-130_Letter_to_President_Clinton_Re-
FMLA-UI.pdf. Note that the Labor Policy Association is now known as the HR Policy 
Association. 
 3. This has changed in practice, as workers’ own illnesses dominate FMLA use in the 
case law. COMM’N ON LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY 
AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES 94 fig. 5.2 (1996) (showing that 60% of FMLA-covered leave 
is taken because of a worker’s own health problems). In addition, as it evolved over the years, 
elder care became an increasing focus of the Act. STEVEN K. WISENSALE, FAMILY LEAVE 
POLICY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORK AND FAMILY IN AMERICA 125 (2001). 
 4. I say “some” because it is limited in all the other ways previously mentioned: no wage 
replacement, limited application to employers, etc. 
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promise that workers will “never again have to choose between the 
job they need and the family they love”5—the FMLA captures only a 
small slice of the difficulties.6 This limitation stems from the fact that 
the FMLA’s protection rests on specific triggering events. Other than 
the birth of a child, these events are premised on there being a serious 
crisis or emergency—on something extraordinary befalling a family. 
On the other hand, the challenges surrounding the work-family 
balance are, as we now know, distinctly ordinary. 
The challenges associated with balancing our routine family 
obligations and our identities as workers have received tremendous 
attention of late from the business community, women’s groups, 
academics, and in society generally. Many policy proposals attempt 
to address these challenges, including a reinvigorated hours cap under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act,7 reforms in part-time work and in the 
use of flex-time,8 and childcare support, just to name a few of the 
many examples.  
But as work in path-dependence teaches us, when a statute has 
already passed, it changes the course of policy discussion on a topic. 
The FMLA, as currently conceived, might seem to have limited 
potential for achieving a better work-family policy over the course of 
one’s working life, rather than just during crises. Yet the legislation 
does have the distinct advantage of already being enacted. Thus, it is 
worth investigating the FMLA as a platform for further work-family 
accommodations. The value of building upon what is already there is 
 5. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Clinton Presidential Materials 
Project, Statement by the President on the Fifth Anniversary of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/08/1998-08-05-statement-by-the-president-on-
5th-year-anniversary-of-fmla.html (Aug. 5, 1998). 
 6. E.g., TODD D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND THE BALANCE OF 
LIFE 146 (2002); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 44–56 (2000); Angie K. Young, Assessing the Family and 
Medical Leave Act in Terms of Gender Equality, Work/Family Balance, and the Needs of 
Children, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 142–43 (1998); Ellen Goodman, Missing the Point—
Again—on Parental Leave, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 1999, at D7. 
 7. E.g., Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (2001); 
Juliet B. Schor, Worktime in Contemporary Context: Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 157 (1995); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 
(2000).  
 8. E.g., Mary Ann Mason, Beyond Equal Opportunity: A New Vision for Women 
Workers, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 393, 405–08 (1992); WILLIAMS, supra 
note 6, at 112. 
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reflected in several bills that have been introduced to expand the 
FMLA’s coverage. President Clinton proposed the Family Friendly 
Workplace Act of 1996 to require employers to provide up to three 
additional days per year of leave for a child’s educational needs, or 
for routine family medical purposes, including attending to an older 
relative’s health needs.9 In the House of Representatives, the Family 
and Medical Leave Improvements Act would have given an 
additional twenty-four hours per year to volunteer at a child’s school 
or to attend a parent-teacher conference or school performance 
related to the child’s advancement.10 These efforts reflect the idea 
that the FMLA could be the platform for legislation making the 
balancing of family and work roles easier generally, and not just in 
the event of medical crises. These FMLA amendment proposals aim 
to transform the Act into one that addresses more ordinary work-
family conflicts. This expanded vision for the FMLA—as a broader 
work-family balancing regime rather than as a bridge over medical 
emergencies—would constitute a considerable evolution in the 
mainstreaming of work-family issues.  
Significantly, however, the expansions envisioned in these 
amendments have not been passed in Congress. The provocative 
question addressed here is whether the “expansions” were already 
made law by the FMLA in 1993. 
Against the backdrop of the legislative amendment debate, this 
Article evaluates what federal courts, independent of Congress, have 
done to contribute to the evolution of the FMLA beyond medical 
crises and towards a balanced work-life regime. The Article will 
evaluate a strand of cases interpreting key language in the FMLA: 
“serious health condition.”11  
Before a person can qualify for FMLA leave, either the worker 
herself, or else a qualifying family member, must have a serious 
health condition.12 Imagine two possible interpretations of that term. 
The first views a serious health condition as an emergency, such as 
 9. Family Friendly Workplace Act, S. 4, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 10. Family and Medical Leave Improvements Act of 1997, H.R. 109, 105th Cong. 
§ 4(a)(3)(A)(I) (1997). 
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2000). 
 12. The Department of Labor has issued regulations interpreting the term. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.114 (2003). 
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an aneurism, a fractured hip from a car accident, or a pancreatic 
cancer diagnosis. If these calamities befell a worker’s child or spouse, 
they would turn the worker’s life upside down, and likely would 
prevent her from going to work for a period of time. That version of 
“serious health condition” would offer someone in a hard-luck 
situation the support of job security. 
Now imagine a different interpretation of the term “serious health 
condition.” Imagine that it includes the flu, migraine headaches, 
childhood ear infections, conjunctivitis, bronchial infections, or strep 
throat. As with the more dire situations, if one of these conditions 
befell a worker’s child, it would likely prevent the worker from going 
to work for a period of time, albeit a shorter one, while she stayed 
home to care for her sick child. It would not turn her life upside 
down, however, and though these events create childcare 
emergencies, they are not commonly considered grave emergencies. 
Instead, they are ordinary occurrences. From a worker’s perspective, 
what makes such ordinary work disruption a crisis is the prospect of 
job loss due to absenteeism while managing the relatively minor 
health and caregiving problem.  
The first interpretation of the term “serious health condition” 
envisions a federal policy of job security for medical emergencies. 
The second interpretation might envision a federal policy of job 
security even in the event of a routine work-family balancing 
challenge—in other words, federally mandated sick days and 
personal days.13 
Early cases seemed to be grounded securely in the former, the 
“dire medical emergencies” camp, in interpreting serious health 
conditions under the Act. A few more recent cases, however, have 
leaned more towards the latter interpretation, granting FMLA leave to 
a parent for her child’s ear infection or to a worker for his own flu.14  
 13. Twelve weeks of leave is not medically necessary to recover from childbirth, but 
rather it represents an entitlement to healthy family integration time. Such an understanding of 
family needs is positive, but it is strange to cap the time at twelve weeks and apply it to new 
children only.  
 14. For a discussion of the cases, see infra Part II of this Article. The case outcomes are 
still quite mixed. But Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) has introduced legislation, entitled “The 
Family and Medical Leave Clarification Act,” to roll back the decisions allowing FMLA 
coverage for more minor illnesses. S. 320, 108th Cong. (2003). The Senator likely was 
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Why would a federal bench widely believed to prefer the most 
restrictive available interpretation of civil rights or employee benefits 
statutes choose an expansive interpretation here? This is puzzling, 
particularly because a less expansive interpretation is not only 
available, but may even be more plausible as a matter of discernable 
legislative intent. I speculate that this nascent development may 
reflect the deepened understanding we have gained into the nature of 
the work-family balancing problem since the FMLA’s passage ten 
years ago. I further posit that the problems of balancing work and 
family have been domesticated; they have moved beyond the realm 
of a solely equality-based, feminist concern to that of a more 
universal worker and family concern.15 
Part I of this Article maps out the road the FMLA took to become 
a law without any apparent focus on the routine balancing problems 
that face working parents over the life cycle of dependent care. Part II 
examines the evolving case law on the key term, “serious health 
condition.” Part III offers a possible explanation for the trend towards 
the changed views of work and family balance. Part IV compares the 
judicial sympathy here to that shown in sexual harassment cases, 
looking for similarities in the mainstreaming of the issues by framing 
them not only as equality issues, but also as decency issues. Part V 
concludes that the trend is modest, that further legislation to expand 
the FMLA is still needed, and that the sexual harassment law analogy 
may indicate an area of concern. 
responding to business community complaints on the same subject. See Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the 
House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Hearings]; 149 
CONG. REC. S2005 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Judd Gregg introducing the 
Family and Medical Leave Clarification Act); Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice 
President of Government Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to U.S. Representative Judy 
Biggert, at http://www. uschamber.com/government/letters/030121hr35.htm (Jan. 21, 2003); 
Watson Wyatt Insider, FMLA Concerns Prompt New Legislation, at 
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/ insider/showarticle.asp?ArticleID=9151.  
 15. I made a similar point in Katharine B. Silbaugh, Foreword: The Structures of Care 
Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389 (2001). 
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I. THE PATH TO THE NARROW CONCEPTION OF A FAMILY-FRIENDLY 
WORKPLACE REFORM ACT 
The understanding of work and family has changed tremendously 
in the fifteen years since the FMLA was first put on the table. We 
now see the effect that care of dependents, especially child 
dependents, have on women’s status as workers in a different light. I 
will grossly oversimplify this change in light of space constraints.16  
During the 1980s, many women’s organizations argued that if 
women could receive a small accommodation for the temporary 
physical disability associated with childbirth, then women would 
have what they needed to be the true equals of male workers.17 
Concerns that women not be distinguished from men by long-term 
ties to dependents motivated much of the legal product coming from 
the women’s organizations. This strategy was necessitated by the 
political and cultural circumstances of the time, which included 
widespread and strong skepticism in the business community as to 
women’s capabilities as workers at the most basic level. In the 
process of responding to the blatant discrimination against women on 
the basis of their parenthood, the longer-term needs of female or male 
workers with significant responsibilities to dependents failed to 
receive the planning and commitment that the FMLA afforded the 
narrower issue of the weeks following childbirth.18  
 16. Varied understandings were of course available at the time, but they were realistically 
sacrificed in the face of the political conditions of the time. E.g., Christine A. Littleton, Equality 
and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1043, 1051 (1987).  
 17. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1985); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on 
Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982); David Cole, Strategies of 
Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s World, 2 LAW & INEQ. 33 (1984) 
(describing the litigation strategy of leading women’s rights advocate Ruth Bader Ginsburg of 
the ACLU); Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984–85). 
 18. To be clear, I do not mean to criticize that stance under the conditions of its time; I 
shared this view at that time. Moreover, the feminist visionaries of the 1970s did argue in favor 
of the expansive availability of high quality daycare as a key foundation for women’s 
workplace advancement, a critical battle that still has not been won thirty years later. See Nat’l 
Council of Jewish Women, Programs and Projects: Child Care Milestones, at 
http://www.ncjw.org/programs/childcare-milestones.htm (describing the history of efforts to 
achieve universal childcare). 
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Today, the challenges a worker faces managing his identity as a 
worker and his role as a caregiver are not only understood to extend 
well beyond the first twelve weeks of an infant’s life, but also are 
understood to raise ongoing and formally gender-neutral policy 
questions. We have now seen extensive study and debate over the 
consequences of the “second shift” for women in the paid labor 
force,19 the inflexible structures in the workplace that are as much a 
product of tradition as necessity,20 and a serious evaluation by both 
policymakers and business consultants of the kind of support that 
could substantially benefit parents in the workplace.21 We must 
consider the extent to which the FMLA was premised on the infant-
only understanding of work and family, and the extent to which it 
incorporated hints of the explosion of work-family research and 
programming by industry,22 government, and academia that was to 
come in the decade following the FMLA’s passage. 
A. The Road to the Content of the Act.  
The story of the FMLA’s passage is a familiar one. It took eight 
years for the bill to get through Congress and the Oval Office—
including President George H.W. Bush’s veto and a failed 
congressional override vote—before being signed into law by 
President Clinton.23 Through that process, many compromises were 
 19. The term is a reference to Arlie Hochschild’s treatise, The Second Shift (1989), but the 
subsequent literature is far too extensive for citation. See, e.g., Katharine B. Silbaugh, Turning 
Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 20. See WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 84–113, for a discussion of some unnecessary 
workplace constraints on parents. 
 21. See Mary B. Young, The Evolving World of Work and Family: New Stakeholders, 
New Voices, Diverse Families, 562 ANNALS 32 (1999); Carol Kleiman, Worklife Improvements 
Get Serious Attention, Even at a Time of Economic and Political Turmoil, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 
2003. The business trend in favor of work-life programs is the subject of Arlie Russell 
Hochschild’s book, The Time Bind (1997). 
 22. See, e.g., Fisher Vista, Industry Overview, at http://www.fishervista.com/industry.htm.  
 23. The first bill was The Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, providing for 
eighteen weeks of unpaid leave to a parent for the birth or adoption of a newborn or the care of 
a seriously ill child, plus twenty-six weeks disability leave. ANYA BERNSTEIN, THE 
MODERATION DILEMMA: LEGISLATIVE COALITIONS AND THE POLITICS OF FAMILY AND 
MEDICAL LEAVE 94–95 (2001). It was championed by Rep. Patricia Schroeder. Id. In 1990, the 
Family and Medical Leave Act passed the House. In 1991, the Bill passed both the House and 
the Senate, but was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush, and the House could not produce 
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made to the bill.24 Proponents of family leave statutes were dealing 
with the extraordinary fact that the United States was one of very few 
industrial nations without a family leave policy; even so, the fight 
was fierce to win any federal movement on the issue.  
Against that backdrop, the ambitions were limited from the outset. 
For example, even the early versions of the bill did not include wage 
replacement.25 To make things worse, through the many versions and 
years of legislative activity on the subject, compromises were made 
by proponents in order to pick up more votes. Some hoped for a four 
month leave in the event of childbirth,26 and more particularly for the 
application of the law to more employers. Those hopes were 
abandoned, however, in negotiations for congressional votes.27  
The FMLA was originally conceived as a “parental” leave statute, 
intended to deal with the unusual failure of the American legal 
system to deal with the consequences of childbirth or adoption by 
parent-workers. But the coverage was expanded to include a worker’s 
own illness, as well as the care of sick family members.28 This 
expansion reflected a careful strategy to broaden the bill’s support 
base to include unions and senior citizens,29 and to draw attention 
away from gender-based implications of parental leave, instead 
suggesting the more general principle that pro-family policy meant 
that workers’ medical emergencies should not cost them their jobs.30 
Although the expansion of triggering events aimed to broaden the 
coalition for passage,31 the heart of the bill from a gender 
perspective—a bill which had the women’s groups as its original and 
enough votes to override the veto. Id. at 103.  
 24. BERNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 98–101. 
 25. The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986, H.R. 4300, 99th Cong. (1986); 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 96. 
 26. These standards were all watered down during negotiations. See BERNSTEIN, supra 
note 23, at 101. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 98–99.  
 29. Gaining support from unions and the AARP was a key reason to expand the coverage. 
See id. at 99. 
 30. See id. at 99–100. 
 31. I support those expansions because the care of adult children or aging parents is 
demanding work that society depends upon; I simply point out the strategy behind changing a 
parent-friendly bill into a more universal one. 
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most sustaining supporters32—was the notion that women’s status as 
workers is affected by the birth or adoption of a child. Earlier years 
had seen litigation over the provision of disability benefits to mothers 
of newborns33 and the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
to amend Title VII, as well as ample law review commentary on the 
relationship between maternity and women’s roles as workers.34 The 
many sides to this debate were most clearly played out in California 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra.35 Under the combined 
circumstances of business groups’ opposition to any parental leave 
and women’s groups’ concerns regarding the stereotyping of parent-
workers, the FMLA coverage became what it is today. 
B. The Effects of the Compromises in the FMLA.  
As the use of the FMLA has unfolded, it is the application of the 
Act to an employee’s own illnesses, rather than to her caretaking 
responsibilities, that has caused the most criticism by employers. 
Industry groups,36 congressional critics,37 and some commentators38 
commonly complain that the FMLA’s largest impact is as a sick-
leave statute for the worker herself; in other words, they argue that 
the “Medical” in “Family and Medical Leave Act” has, in practice, 
swamped the leave taken by new parents. Research on the use of the 
FMLA corroborates these observations.39 Industry groups decry what 
they view as the expansion of FMLA usage beyond that purpose 
 32. BERNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 95. In fact, just this year, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the Court, said the “family care” provisions of the FMLA clearly qualify as anti-
discrimination measures, leaving open the question of the medical leave so heavily utilized in 
the law. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 33. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Nashville Gas Co. v. 
Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 34. See supra note 17.  
 35. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). See BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING 
WOMEN SERIOUSLY 101–04 (2d ed. 2001) (summarizing the Guerra debate). 
 36. See Josten, supra note 14; Hearings, supra note 14; Insider, supra note 14. 
 37. 149 CONG. REC. S2005 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Judd Gregg 
introducing the Family Medical Leave Clarification Act). 
 38. Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. 
REV. 395, 407–09 (1999). 
 39. See COMM’N ON LEAVE, supra note 3, at 94 fig.5.2. 
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which sold the American public on the idea: family leave for a baby’s 
arrival.40 
From a work-family balance standpoint, we must determine how 
to view the industry complaints over the expansive uses of the 
FMLA. There are two components to the criticisms that we need to 
distinguish: concern about employees using leave for their own 
illnesses instead of for family care, and concern about the type of 
illness that either a family member or the employee herself may use 
to trigger the leave.  
Proponents of the FMLA must ensure that the distinct components 
are not merged. Industry may be upset because the employee uses the 
FMLA for her own illnesses rather than to care for family members, 
in place of company sick leave policies. The leave was sold to the 
nation as a family-oriented benefit, and the overwhelming use of the 
Act to benefit the self may be surprising to industry. On the other 
hand, industry could be upset because of the ordinary nature of the 
medical events that lead to worker leave, whether the event affects 
the worker herself or her dependents. If it is the former, the 
complaints are that the FMLA has superseded industry sick leave 
policies; if the latter, then complaints are that the FMLA has turned 
the family care provisions into protections intended to catch the 
occasional “dropped ball” in the ordinary work-family juggling act. 
Industry may not be making this distinction when it attacks the 
relaxed standards for defining a serious health condition, because 
ordinarily the worker is invoking the FMLA to cover her own flu-
level illness, and not the illnesses of her dependents. 
A look at the text, regulations, and cases interpreting the term 
“serious health conditions” illuminates the debate over the proper 
scope of the term. 
 40. NBC Nightly News: The High Cost of Good Intentions (NBC television broadcast, 
May 3, 1997) (transcript on file with author). 
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II. SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITIONS WITHIN THE STATUTE AND THE 
CASE LAW 
A. Recent Permissive Interpretations 
In the past few years, a few courts have interpreted the term 
“serious health condition” to include what can be thought of as 
ordinary short-term illnesses, seemingly expanding the scope of 
events covered under the FMLA. For example, in Miller v. AT&T,41 
the Fourth Circuit decided that the common flu can be an illness 
requiring employer accommodation under the FMLA, assuming that 
it meets certain criteria.42 This is particularly surprising because in 
the relevant Department of Labor regulations, the flu is listed as an 
example of an illness not covered by the FMLA.43 In Caldwell v. 
Holland of Texas, the Eighth Circuit held that a parent is permitted to 
take FMLA leave to stay home with her son during what appeared at 
the time of the leave to be an ordinary childhood ear infection.44 
I hasten to add that courts’ treatment of the term is mixed,45 and 
that the cases applying the FMLA to minor illnesses are 
comparatively recent and few. For those who like this development, 
the glass can be either half full or half empty. But this expansive 
strain of decisions is noteworthy enough to have elicited an alarmed 
reaction from opponents of an expanded FMLA. The business 
community is unhappy with the recent development of this liberal 
strand of interpretation of “serious health condition.” It has prodded 
 41. 250 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 42. Id. at 830. 
 43. Compare Miller v. AT&T, 250 F.3d 820, 830 (4th Cir. 2001) (including flu within the 
FMLA’s scope), with 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(c) (expressly excluding flu). 
 44. 208 F.3d 671, 676 (8th Cir. 2000). The ear infection later required surgery, indicating 
that it was a more serious, but hardly uncommon, version of an ordinary childhood ear 
infection. Id. at 675–76. See also Brannon v. OshKosh B’Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1995) (holding that the employee’s daughter’s upper respiratory infection was a serious 
health condition under the FMLA because she visited a health care provider, was given a course 
of medication, and was advised by a doctor to stay home from daycare until her fever broke). 
 45. E.g., Seidle v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 238, 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(holding that the ear infection of employee’s child did not constitute a serious health condition, 
in contrast to Caldwell); Mell v. Weyburn-Bartel, Inc., 1997 WL 626093, at *4 (W.D. Mich. 
July 28, 1997) (holding that the flu does not constitute a serious health condition under the 
FMLA, in apparent contrast with Miller).  
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Congress to consider what is called the “Family and Medical Leave 
Clarification Act,” introduced in February 2003 by Senator Judd 
Gregg of New Hampshire.46 The proposed Act would contract the 
meaning of “serious health condition” in light of these recent 
decisions. Thus, the trend is certainly expansive enough to be noticed 
by the business community. 
B. Linking These Interpretations to Work-Family Balance 
How do the more permissive interpretations of “serious health 
condition” connect to the concern that the FMLA—which focuses its 
ordinary parenting provisions on newborns—is not responsive to the 
larger problem of work-family policy? As passed, the FMLA 
arguably applied to only one “ordinary” event: the birth or adoption 
of a child. The other events, medical crises of a parent or child, are 
represented as extraordinary hard-luck events (in other words, as 
events that are exceptional and disruptive, not ordinary).47  
Holding that the flu constitutes a serious health condition might 
imply that a parent is entitled to take unpaid leave from work to 
attend to a child who is sick enough to be home in bed for three days 
and to need a trip to the doctor. This kind of illness, however, can 
occur with some frequency in both young children and the elderly. 
The work dilemma of a parent whose child is bedridden with an 
ordinary childhood ailment is evident. A similar phenomenon applies 
when adult children must stay home to care for an aging parent with 
the flu. 
Miller pertained to the employee’s own illness, as most FMLA 
cases do.48 However, the Eighth Circuit faced a parenting case in 
Caldwell.49 There the court held that a mother was covered by the 
FMLA such that she could not be fired for staying home with her 
three-year-old son who had an ear infection. The court played up the 
severity of the ear infection in its recitation of the facts: the child was 
 46. Family and Medical Leave Clarification Act, S. 320, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003). 
 47. I am aware that the health crises of aging parents are in fact ordinary, but the form 
they take and their impact on workers varies widely, and are unpredictable to the worker. 
 48. Cf. COMM’N ON LEAVE, supra note 3, at 94 fig.5.2. 
 49. 208 F.3d 671.  
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kept in bed “as much as possible”;50 he underwent two ten-day 
courses of antibiotics; and eventually, he had surgery to remove his 
tonsils and adenoids.51 The court does not rest the holding on the 
surgery, which occurred after the mother’s work absence.52 Rather, it 
seems that the two courses of antibiotics and the corresponding trips 
to the emergency room, along with the child’s incapacity in bed, were 
adequate to qualify the illness as a serious health condition. As sick 
as a child under these circumstances feels, ear infections and this kind 
of treatment are a very common childhood occurrence. 
Accommodating them exemplifies the routine aggravations of a 
parent’s working life.53  
Some Republicans in Congress are outraged because in their view, 
the FMLA was meant to apply only to catastrophic illnesses.54 The 
interpretation being given by these courts, however, suggests that the 
ordinary may also be eligible for coverage, being wrapped up as it is 
in a parent-worker’s conflicting role obligations. The debate over the 
meaning of “serious health conditions” could transform or better 
define whether the FMLA could be a broader family accommodation 
statute. 
C. President Clinton’s Implementing Regulations 
The cases’ interpretations are partially driven by a progressive 
president’s administrative regulations. The Clinton administration’s 
Department of Labor first issued temporary implementing regulations 
soon after the FMLA’s passage.55 It issued permanent regulations in 
1996,56 which provided, in part, that a condition could be deemed 
“serious” if it led to at least three days of “incapacitation” and 
involved “continuing treatment by a health care provider.” This could 
 50. Id. at 675 (finding fulfillment of the “incapacity” requirement under the regulations). 
 51. Id. at 673. This surgery, however, which took place after the work absences in 
question, was not critical to the finding of a serious health condition.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Peggy Auinger et al., Trends in Otitis Media Among Children in the United States, 
112 PEDIATRICS 514, 514–20 (2003). 
 54. 149 CONG. REC. S2005-07 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Judd Gregg 
regarding the Family and Medical Leave Clarification Act). 
 55. 29 C.F.R. § 825 (1993). 
 56. 29 C.F.R. § 825 (1995), as amended by 60 Fed. Reg. 2180 (Feb. 6, 1995). 
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entail as little as one trip to a health care provider along with a course 
of treatment that could be described as “under the supervision” of 
that provider, whether or not an additional visit is paid.57 
“Incapacity” need not be as comprehensive as under the ADA;58 
rather, it generally indicates the inability to go to work or school.59 
When applied to the illness of the worker herself, the logic of being 
unable to go to work is clear. When applied to a dependent of the 
worker who is an adult, such as a parent, the test is whether the 
dependent has the capacity for self-care.60 But when the dependant is 
a child, the capacity for self-care in unclear. Children, by definition, 
lack the full capacity for self-care; the practical measure, therefore, 
could be described as whether their care can continue to be delegated 
to their ordinary daycare, school, after-school, or other care program. 
Therefore, despite judicial rulings that childcare problems do not 
receive protection under the FMLA in the absence of illness,61 under 
some circumstances, childcare problems will in fact be the measure 
of whether protection is available. Consider an example of how 
incapacity is interpreted. 
In Caldwell, incapacity of a three-year-old was interpreted as 
being unable to go to daycare—what the dissenting opinion in the 
case calls “sniffle standards.”62 “Under the continuing care of a 
medical provider” is interpreted as taking antibiotics prescribed by a 
physician. The sniffle standard may reflect a daycare center’s 
attendance rule for children taking antibiotics, where a child’s need 
specifically for parental care is considered paramount. 
The regulations are potentially permissive. The courts, on several 
important occasions, have exercised such potential in favor of 
 57. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i)(B). 
 58. Stekloff v. St. John’s Mercy Health Sys., 218 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing 29 
C.F.R. § 825.702(b)) (“[T]he applicable regulations emphasize that the ‘ADA’s “disability” and 
[the] FMLA’s “serious health condition” are different concepts, and must be analyzed 
separately.’”). 
 59. The text of the regulation says incapacity, for example, may be seen as the “inability 
to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health 
condition, treatment therefore, or recovery therefrom.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i). 
 60. Sakellarion v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (citing 29 
U.S.C. § 2611(12)(B)). 
 61. Evans v. Henderson, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 962 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2001). 
 62. Caldwell, 208 F.3d at 260 (Hansen, J., dissenting). 
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employees,63 though other court interpretations of the regulations 
have demonstrated that the permissive course is not the only one 
available.64 
D. A Conservative Judiciary? 
The regulations notwithstanding, it is curious that generally 
conservative courts would find an expansive definition of a 
regulatory statute placing a mandate on the employer. Does this 
interpretation reflect evolving norms about the accommodation of the 
relationship between employment and family obligations? Clearly, 
those norms have evolved—the public discourse, business discourse, 
and legal discourse have all expanded and evolved since the adoption 
of the FMLA ten years ago. Perhaps the judiciary, too, has shared in 
the transformation of norms of work-family balance. 
III. PERMISSIVE INTERPRETATIONS AS A WORK-FAMILY POLICY 
NORM 
If this is, in fact, a development,65 we must endeavor to explain it. 
In a recent New York Times Week in Review, Linda Greenhouse 
speculated that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s surprisingly sympathetic 
opinion in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs might 
spring from a new appreciation for the strains of the working 
parent.66 Apparently, Chief Justice Rehnquist has needed to leave 
work several times to pick his grandchildren up from school when his 
own daughter has had difficulty with her childcare arrangement. 
Perhaps this is just a coincidence, with no causal connection to 
Hibbs—one can only speculate. But perhaps we can strengthen the 
 63. Miller v. AT&T, 250 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 2001); Caldwell v. Holland of Tex., Inc., 208 
F.3d 671, 677 (8th Cir. 2000); Brannon v. Oshkosh B’Gosh, 897 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. Tenn. 
1995). 
 64. Henderson v. Cent. Progressive Bank, 2002 WL 31086086 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2002); 
Mell v. Wayburn-Bartel, Inc., 1997 WL 626093 (W.D. Mich. July 28, 1997); Seidle v. 
Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 65. Even beyond the cases, the best evidence that the trend is noticeable is that 
conservative lawmakers are seeking to reverse it through the Family and Medical Leave 
Clarification Act. 
 66. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Linda Greenhouse, 
Heartfelt Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 4, at 3. 
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suggestion of a link between changes in the cultural, political, and 
commercial attitude toward work-family balancing issues and case 
outcomes with an examination of the distance we have traveled in the 
past ten years. Below is a brief look at the changes in industry 
practices, culture, political discourse, and academic thought regarding 
work-family balance. 
A. Changes in Industry Practice 
Human resources departments of large employers now offer 
programs and expertise in work-family balancing issues that were 
unheard of when the FMLA was first introduced in the mid-1980s.67 
One human resources industry group lists the following benefits that 
employers now offer, most of which are family-oriented: Work life 
counseling and referral Employee Assistance Programs (EAP); Life 
event portals; Elder care; Concierge; Wellness; Voluntary benefits; 
On-site childcare; Legal assistance; Lactation services; Flexible work 
consulting; Financial education; Discounted shopping; and 
Emergency back-up childcare.68 Fisher Vista, a public relations firm 
for the human resources industry, claims the first employer-provided 
childcare referral service arose sometime during the 1980s. However, 
the additional forms of assistance listed above, which are now 
frequently provided by employers, did not arise until the 1990s.69 The 
explosion in voluntary benefit programs by large employers places 
work-family issues on a different playing field than existed during the 
battle to pass the FMLA. 
A 1998 survey by Ellen Galinsky of the Families and Work 
Institute and James T. Bond reported that, out of all employers with 
100 or more employees, over half provide some form of flexible 
schedule for workers, as well as a program to allow the tax-free 
payment of some childcare expenses through dependent care 
assistance accounts.70 Over one-third of employers allowed more than 
 67. For an overview of some of the programs offered by employers, see Lotte Bailyn et 
al., Intergrating Work and Family Life: A Holistic Approach (Executive Summary), at 
http://lsir.la.psu.edu/workfam/WorkFamily-sum.pdf. 
 68. Fisher Vista, Industry Overview, at http://www.fishervista.com/industry.htm. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Ellen Galinsky & James T. Bond, Supporting Families as Primary Caregivers: The 
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twelve weeks of maternity leave.71 By responding to the needs of 
workers, employers have helped to raise the bar for work-family 
accommodation, and perhaps the sense of entitlement, in the culture 
at large. 
B. Changes in Cultural Awareness of Work-Family Conflict 
Coverage of work-family balancing issues in the news has become 
ubiquitous. Major papers and magazines have columns devoted 
entirely to issues of work and family.72 Recent books are too 
countless to name.73 News reports about studies touching on the 
work-family issue seem to come out faster than we can read them.74 It 
is almost impossible to be a consumer of news during the past ten 
years and to have avoided the debates and analyses of the issue. On 
some level, the issues have become common knowledge.  
C. Changes in Political Discourse 
In addition to congressional attempts to expand the FMLA to 
cover parent-teacher conferences and children’s doctor appointments, 
as discussed above,75 the political landscape has been packed in the 
past ten years with work-family initiatives. As examples, consider 
Democratic Presidential candidate Al Gore’s stump speech, which 
contained a plea for universal preschool.76 President Clinton’s 2001 
budget called for “Universal After-School Opportunities for Children 
Role of the Workplace, in INFANTS AND TODDLERS IN OUT OF HOME CARE 309, 318 (Debby 
Cryer & Thelma Harms eds., 2001). 
 71. Id. at 318. 
 72. See, for example, the Work and Family column of the Wall Street Journal, and the 
Work and Family column in Business Week. 
 73. See, e.g., IT’S ABOUT TIME: COUPLES AND CAREERS (Phyllis Moen ed., 2003); 
WORKING FAMILIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME (Rosanna Hertz & 
Nancy L. Marshall eds., 2001); ROSALIND C. BARNETT & CARYL RIVERS, SHE WORKS/HE 
WORKS: HOW TWO-INCOME FAMILIES ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF (1996).  
 74. See generally WORK-FAMILY RESEARCH: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (complied 
by Terri Ann Lilly et al., 1997); Facing the Grail: Confronting the Cost of Work-Family 
Imbalance, BBA TASK FORCE REPORTS (Task Force on Professional Challenges and Family 
Needs) (1999), available at http://www.bostonbar.org/grail/workfamilychallenges.htm. 
 75. See discussion of these reform proposals, supra Introduction. 
 76. E.g., THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, New Ideas for a New Century: Universal 
Preschool (2000), at http://www.ideas2000.org/Issues/Education/Universal_Preschool.pdf. 
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and Teenagers Most in Need.”77 Countless legislative efforts to 
improve the availability, affordability, and quality of childcare have 
been proposed.78 Federal initiatives in recent years have attempted to 
address the difficulties facing working-family caregivers of an aged 
or disabled relative.79 
In the past ten years, unions have developed and disseminated 
detailed tools for negotiating over work and family issues, ranging 
from before- and after-school care to flexible schedules to voluntary 
reduced time.80 In the past several years, the AFL-CIO began 
supporting family-friendly policies as an official position.81 Union 
interest reflects the desire among the workforce for better work-
family accommodation. 
For several years, there has been a battle to pass a bill called the 
Working Families Flexibility Act, which would allow workers to 
choose compensatory time instead of pay under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.82 Democrats have opposed the bill due to their belief 
that it would give employers too much ability to persuade or prevent 
workers from taking the overtime pay on which they currently rely. 
Republicans have marketed the bill as an answer to the inflexibility 
of the workplace for working parents. Whether out of sincere concern 
for families or as a strategic play in an ongoing struggle between 
employers and labor, addressing work-family balancing issues is 
considered so appealing that the framing of an act as family-friendly 
legislation has come to carry political leverage. 
 77. A Blueprint for the Future: The Clinton Administration’s FY2001 Budget and 
Legislative Proposals for Teenagers and Their Families, at http://clinton3.nara.gov/WH/New/ 
html/teenconf2.html. 
 78. E.g., National Women’s Law Center, Focus on Committed and Underpaid Staff for 
Children’s Sake Act: The “Focus” Act (2001), at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/FOCUSFactSheet. 
pdf (supporting S.814 and H.R.1650, which provide for federal assistance to recruit and retain 
qualified childcare providers). 
 79. See Wendy Fox-Grage et al., Federal and State Policy in Family Caregiving: Recent 
Victories but Uncertain Future, Policy Brief No. 2, Family Caregiver Alliance (Oct. 2001), at 
http://www.caregiver.org/caregiver/jsp/content/pdfs/op_2001_10_policybrief_2.pdf. 
 80. See, e.g., Labor Project for Working Families, Work and Family Contract Language, 
at http://www.laborproject.org/bargaining/language.html. 
 81. AFL-CIO, Convention 2001, at http://www.workfam.com/convention01/ 
updates_1205_4.htm. 
 82. H.R. REP. NO. 105-21, § 2 (1997). 
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D. Changes in Academic Discipline 
There is always a question of the extent to which academic 
disciplines influence federal judges. Influence notwithstanding, the 
literature certainly can help us to interpret the trend. In particular, the 
past decade has seen a great deal of criticism of three tendencies: (1) 
not to account for the work of dependent care, instead assuming this 
gets done naturally within families; (2) to consider such care a private 
issue in the sense that it does not engage public policy; and (3) in the 
case of children, to hold parents responsible for their care without 
public responsibility or support. The emergency model of the FMLA 
may reflect the understanding that there are crisis instances when the 
private becomes public and employers must respond, but this 
reallocation is limited to extraordinary events, not ordinary ones. 
But suppose that there has been evolution on this point in light of 
the increased numbers of middle-class working mothers, as well as 
the industrial, cultural, and academic attention to work-family issues. 
If, in fact, the consensus understanding is evolving, then perhaps the 
care of children is being understood to raise serious public policy 
questions and to necessitate public-private partnerships, at least in 
some situations. Perhaps the trend in the FMLA cases providing job 
security to affected workers reflects an increased willingness to 
spread the responsibility for the care of children occasionally beyond 
the private family. 
Consider the work of Martha Fineman in the mid-1990s, which 
argued that dependency is inevitable and a part of human nature for 
all people, rather than a pathology of the undeserving.83 Fineman 
argued that because every person is a child at some point, there is no 
such thing as independence, and therefore claims for support are both 
inevitable and normal. She argued that we have historically avoided 
the implications of that dependency by privatizing it; that is, we have 
made dependency a family matter rather than one that engages public 
resources or policy. 
Nancy Folbre has argued that economics has assumed that care is 
naturally provided by “the invisible heart,” just as efficiency is 
 83. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 161–64 (1995). 
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naturally produced by the “invisible hand” of private markets. Says 
Folbre, people have “generally assumed that God, nature, the family, 
and ‘SuperMom’—or some combination thereof—would 
automatically provide whatever care was needed.”84 Under that 
understanding, regular accommodations for the ordinary situation 
need not be required of employers. In contrast, if courts choose to 
interpret the FMLA’s job security provision to cover absenteeism due 
to the care of a sick child, then they are allocating some care, and its 
challenges, to the market sector through employers. 
Joan Williams has argued that we have built workplaces around 
an “ideal worker norm”;85 that is, employers have been free to 
assume that a worker is not responsible for the care of dependents, 
that such responsibilities are attended to by others, and that the 
worker is thus free to devote all her energies to her workplace. The 
crimped interpretation of the FMLA can be viewed as keeping with 
that ideal worker view: the FMLA is a statute to deal with the 
physical disability associated with childbirth as the prototypical (if 
not typical) use; employer obligations to assist with work-family 
tension ends promptly at twelve weeks post-partum.  
The more expansive definition of serious health conditions 
embraced in Caldwell, however, suggests potential for an ongoing 
requirement of forbearance in cases where an employee is trapped 
between a need to go to work and the necessity of dealing with an 
illness-related childcare problem. This view suggests a federal statute 
that could accommodate a worker’s status as caregiver to dependents 
in those instances when that status creates ordinary difficulties. 
It is a different world than it was in 1985, or even in 1993, on all 
measures of the awareness and expectations around work and family 
balancing. The speculation here is that the judges in Miller, as well as 
in Caldwell, have been as influenced by the change in consciousness, 
as has the culture at large, and that they may see the fulfillment of the 
promise of the FMLA as permitting a richer protection than 
defendant-employers argued in those cases. 
 84. NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES 1 (2001). 
 85. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 64–113. 
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IV. THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW ANALOGY: EQUALITY OR 
DECENCY? 
If the foregoing changes in cultural-political, corporate, and 
academic thought on work-family balance have had a widespread 
impact, their internalization by a conservative judiciary would not be 
unprecedented. Scholars and journalists have puzzled for a decade or 
more over the apparently enthusiastic embrace by the current 
judiciary of defendant liability for sexual harassment—particularly 
hostile work environment claims—under federal anti-discrimination 
statutes such as Title VII and Title IX. 
Some recent literature on the subject has argued that the sexual 
harassment cases have gradually internalized a civility code for the 
workplace that is at times distinct from the intended anti-
discrimination purposes of sexual harassment causes of action.86 As 
sexual harassment came to be defined by courts as discriminatory, 
Vicki Schultz observes that “feminist tradition may have resonated 
with more conservative political tendencies to create a climate that 
enabled judges to perceive that women, more than men, are routinely 
subjected to sexual advances and assaults that may endanger and 
harm them.”87 
As the legal culture kept pace and reflected the culture at large, 
sexual harassment law came to be associated with what the New York 
Times Magazine recently called “a clumsy substitute for manners.”88 
The notion that extreme sexual harassment is as much offensive as it 
is discriminatory made it easier for judges to condemn. As sexual 
harassment law succeeded at removing sexual content of various 
sorts from many workplaces, conservative judges found it more 
intuitive to respond to the changed norm, and as a great surprise to 
many, they became champions of the cause. The evolving prohibition 
 86. Some see this as a positive development. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and 
Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1 
(1999). For others, it is a cause for serious concern. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized 
Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003). Catharine MacKinnon similarly rued the collapse of a 
distinction between indecency and discrimination that she saw embodied in obscenity law. 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 150 (1987). 
 87. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1748 
(1998). 
 88. Margaret Talbot, Men Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, (Magazine) at 52. 
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against sexual expression in the workplace may coincide nicely with 
some versions of sexual conventionality. Thus, sexual harassment 
law is domesticated; it has evolved from a strictly equality-based 
action to one that also incorporates judicial notions of decency. 
Perhaps the judges in these FMLA decisions value not only the 
equality issues associated with workplace accommodation,89 but also 
a newfound decency standard favoring alleviation of the Hobson’s 
choices that can arise when work and family conflict. That mixed 
standard is affirmatively supported by the statute, which unlike Titles 
VII and IX has as its purposes both an equality component and a 
family welfare component. Whether that decency standard has 
dangers, as the decency standard implicitly incorporated into sexual 
harassment law does, must be evaluated on independent grounds. 
V. LIMITATIONS 
I will mention three important limitations to the potential benefits 
of the new cases discussed here. First, in the sexual harassment 
analogy comes a caution. To the extent that conservative courts 
understand sexuality as uncivil, they reinforce a Victorian notion of 
women, about which many have complained. To the extent that 
conservative judges are attracted to a family-friendly interpretation of 
the FMLA, they may be expressing their maternalistic instincts, to 
which we could expect many to object.90 While a decency-based 
norm of family time need not be as problematic as a decency based 
norm against sexual expression,91 if it is accompanied by sex-based 
expectations, it could bring to life the scenario so feared by women’s 
groups of the 1980s: the equation of women-workers with limited 
potential. To the extent that this is the case, it is incumbent upon 
advocates of work-family accommodations to maintain clarity on 
equality principles. Yet, this is not a reason to criticize a possible 
trend toward a more family-accommodating workplace, if such a 
trend has the independent value so many people now believe it does. 
 89. That value is made explicit in Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 
(2003). 
 90. E.g., Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001). 
 91. For a contra argument, see id. 
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Second, to the extent the development is positive, which I believe 
it is, the case law is mixed. The development of positive case law on 
this subject could be cut off if the current Congress passes the Family 
and Medical Leave Clarification Act into law, as the new bill is 
aimed at reversing the cases discussed above.  
Finally, the range of ordinary work-family challenges covered 
even by this expansive understanding of serious health conditions is 
still a small subset of the ordinary challenges facing working parents. 
Worse, the differences between the covered and uncovered events is 
random. 
Suppose a hypothetical daycare center, which ordinarily 
accommodates ten children, is shut down for a week because of an 
outbreak of head lice. If your child has the head lice, you might visit 
her doctor for prescription shampoo and be instructed on removing 
lice and nits over the course of several days. Ordinary school 
requirements that she be “nit-free” for a period of a week or more 
would give you three days of incapacity. The child would likely have 
a “serious health condition” in the eyes of the Caldwell court. Your 
absence from work would be protected under the FMLA. But, if your 
child is one of the more fortunate children amongst the ten and has 
not been affected by the outbreak, then she has no serious health 
condition. Unfortunately for both of you, the daycare center is closed. 
Now, your parenting responsibilities have interfered with your ability 
to go to work, but you are not covered by the FMLA.92 
If we want to consider accommodations for family-related work 
interruptions, tying them to children’s illnesses will not capture the 
range of ordinary disruptions that can strain a parent worker. Thus, 
even if the trend in the FMLA cases reflects a greater understanding 
of the kind of public-private partnership necessary for a healthier 
work-family climate, more legislation is necessary to deal with work 
interruptions that sometimes arise out of a worker’s care giving role. 
President Clinton’s attempt to gain coverage for attending parent-
teacher conferences, going to doctor appointments, or volunteering in 
a child’s school represents a necessary step in the trend. Some 
legislated employer accommodation of childcare emergencies would 
 92. See, e.g., Evans v. Henderson, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 962 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2001) 
(finding babysitting problems inadequate to sustain a cause of action under the FMLA). 
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go a long way in improving work and family balance, and warrants 
investigation. 
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